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When Does Service Delivery Improve the
Legitimacy of a Fragile or Conflict-Affected State?
CLAIRE MCLOUGHLIN*
Received wisdom holds that the provision of vital public services necessarily
improves the legitimacy of a fragile or conflict-affected state. In practice,
however, the relationship between a state’s performance in delivering ser-
vices and its degree of legitimacy is nonlinear. Specifically, this relationship
is conditioned by expectations of what the state should provide, subjective
assessments of impartiality and distributive justice, the relational aspects of
provision, how easy it is to attribute (credit or blame) performance to the
state, and the characteristics of the service. This questions the dominant
institutional model, which reduces the role of services in (re)building state
legitimacy to an instrumental one. A more rounded account of the signifi-
cance of service delivery for state legitimacy would look beyond the material
to the ideational and relational significance of services, and engage with the
normative criteria by which citizens judge them.
Introduction
Over the past decade, state legitimacy—understood in its simplest form as
citizens’ acceptance of the state’s right to rule—has gained increasing
prominence in state-building debates. The view that illegitimacy under-
mines the state’s capacity and stability is advanced in much of the influ-
ential state-building literature (Kaplan 2008; Lake 2007; Rotberg 2004).
This view is also recently echoed in development policy, where legitimacy
deficits are seen as a key driver of state fragility, and the antithesis of its
corollary—state resilience (Department for International Development
[DFID] 2010; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
[OECD] 2010). Yet the manifest inability of many conflict-affected states to
(re)gain legitimacy has been described as “disappointing” to say the least
(François and Sud 2006). In recognition of this disjuncture between the
significance of legitimacy and its elusiveness, in 2009 the president of the
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World Bank called for legitimacy to henceforth become the “strategic
centre of gravity” for all state-building interventions (Zoellick 2009).
Alongside the rise of legitimacy as a core component of state-building,
there has been a concomitant concern (at least at the rhetorical level) with
understanding the sources of legitimacy available to a state, and how
external aid interventions might influence them (Bellina et al. 2009; OECD
2010). In this vein, there is a striking trend toward framing the provision
of vital public services—including health, education, water, and
sanitation—as a key source of state legitimacy. The OECD (2011, 74) argues
that because basic services represent a material expression of “reciprocal
state-society relations” (the synonym for the social contract), aid interven-
tions in this area “play a major role in enhancing state legitimacy.” So
widespread is the idea of a direct causal link between service delivery and
state legitimacy, some conclude it has achieved the status of a received
wisdom in aid policy (Carpenter, Slater, and Mallet 2012).
There are at least two reasons to question this received wisdom. The
first is to understand what happens to aid for service delivery, tradition-
ally designed primarily to meet critical human needs, when it takes on the
added, political imperative of state-building. The second is that, taken at
face value, the notion that service delivery can instrumentally enhance
state legitimacy appears something of a leap of faith. While a long schol-
arly tradition has unravelled the consequences of legitimacy for the state,
much less is known about how legitimacy is accrued (Carter 2011). To the
degree that social scientists have grappled empirically with legitimacy—
arguably the “hot potato” of politics—there is no consensus around its
origins, other than that these are multiple, interconnected, and context
specific (Gilley 2006, 2009). Although illustrative cases suggest a link
between declining or inadequate service performance and crises of legiti-
macy,1 the reverse proposition—that improved performance enhances
state legitimacy—is not nearly so established (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg,
and Dunn 2012; Gilley 2006).
This article aims to take stock of the theoretical and empirical founda-
tions of the received wisdom that service delivery improves state legiti-
macy. It finds that, in practice, the relationship between a state’s
performance in delivering basic services, on the one hand, and its degree
of legitimacy, on the other, is nonlinear. A number of factors interrupt any
guaranteed or straightforward causal relationship between these vari-
ables. Specifically, to the extent that citizens evaluate the state’s right to
rule through service delivery, this evaluation is likely to be affected by
shifting expectations of what the state should provide, subjective assess-
ments of impartiality and distributive justice, the relational aspects of
provision, how easy it is to attribute (credit or blame) performance to the
state, and the technical and political characteristics of the service.
Albeit indicative, the findings of this article together support the view
that for any given institution to generate legitimacy, it must ultimately be
justifiable by reference to core social values, and resonate with beliefs about
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what is right for society (Beetham 1991). These findings suggest a case for
opening up the dominant institutional model underpinning the contem-
porary aid debate, which reduces the role of services in (re)building
state legitimacy to an instrumental one. They call for a more rounded,
norms-based account of the significance of service delivery for state legiti-
macy: one that looks beyond the material to the ideational and relational
significance of services for citizens’ evaluations of the state. Central to this
is a deeper reading of the social construction of legitimacy that engages
with the moral and normative criteria by which citizens individually and
collectively judge state institutions (Saward 1992).
The article is structured as follows. It begins by setting out the key
propositions underpinning the received wisdom that service delivery
improves state legitimacy, asking to what extent these are informed by
scholarly work on processes of legitimation. The next section goes on to
illustrate that, in practice, a number of factors have been shown to inter-
rupt any linear causal relationship between service delivery and state
legitimacy. Based on these findings, the conclusion advances the case for a
more rounded account of whether and under what conditions service
delivery might alter citizens’ perceptions of the state’s right to rule.
Building State Legitimacy via Service Delivery: Foundations of a
Received Wisdom
In prominent aid literature, the binding of states and societies through the
exchange of services in return for citizen compliance often lies at the heart
of state-building models. Central to this is the idea that basic services—a
function states are universally expected to perform—signals state respon-
siveness, that is, both the willingness and capacity of states to respond to
their citizen’s basic needs (Whaites 2008). One particular value of service
delivery is that as a signal or measure of state performance, it is highly
tangible, in terms of both its physical apparatus and its acute value in
everyday life.Accordingly, the OECD (2011) describe public services as the
visible link between what citizens give the state (taxation) and what they
expect in return (some degree of well-being). In the hierarchy of political
goods, services are meaningful for state–society relations because they
give content to the social contract between ruler and ruled (Rotberg 2004,
2–3). Expressed differently, they are “the glue that binds state and society
together” (Milliken and Krause 2002, 761).
In some aid models, not only does service delivery have direct effects
on state legitimacy, but in turn this legitimacy affords the state greater
capacity to rule (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
[NORAD] 2009). The DFID (2010), for example, portrays a scenario in
which states that respond to public expectations, including for basic ser-
vices, set in motion a “virtuous circle” of state-building. In the DFID
model, responsive services lay the basis for a more inclusive political
settlement, strengthened state–society relations, and, over the long term,
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can address the underlying causes of fragility or conflict (DFID 2010). In
the OECD’s (2008) version of the virtuous circle, states with the requisite
capacity to provide services in line with expectations are rewarded with
increased citizen compliance with its laws and rules—crucially, tax
compliance—which over time boosts state capacity to deliver services
more effectively and, in turn, generates more legitimacy. In this way,
the cycle of capacity, legitimacy and citizen compliance becomes
self-reinforcing.
Another recurring theme is that among the multiple sources of legiti-
macy, service delivery falls squarely into the category of “performance
legitimacy”—that is, a type of legitimacy dependent on the state’s outputs
(OECD 2011, 39). Some distinguish performance legitimacy from other
sources of legitimacy derived from process, or how the state acquires
power and conducts policymaking (Teskey, Schnell, and Poole 2012, 10).
Writing for the Norwegian development agency (NORAD), Bellina et al.
(2009) similarly categorize service delivery as falling into the discreet
category ofwhat the state produces, as distinct from how it functions, or the
kinds of beliefs and shared community supporting the state’s authority.
Hence, to use Weber’s (1962) well-known classification, service delivery is
primarily seen as capable of building legitimacy of the “legal-rational”
variety, that is, legitimacy derived not from charisma or tradition, but from
functioning institutions.
While optimistic about the potential legitimizing effects of service
delivery, development agencies are careful to acknowledge sources of
legitimacy are context specific. Much of the aid literature adopts what
might be termed an empirical definition of state legitimacy, one that
stresses a regime is legitimate when people believe that no other authority
would be superior, while avoiding venturing into the territory of what
types of values and norms should underpin this belief (OECD 2010, 15).2
Accordingly, rather than there being a universal threshold of service access
or coverage that can secure a state’s legitimacy, it is the alignment between
citizens’ home-grown expectations of what the state should deliver and
the state’s capacity to meet these expectations that matters for legitimizing
effects (Bellina et al. 2009; OECD 2008, 2011).
Questioning the Received Wisdom
The idea that services are a visible manifestation of the social contract
resonates through research that positions service bureaucracy as the
primary site where citizens are likely to encounter, and therefore subjec-
tively judge, the state. Stuart Corbridge’s (2005) seminal account of “seeing
the state” in India is a widely cited case in point. He argues local services
provide an opportunity for sightings of the state, and it is through these
that people’s expectations and interpretations of their broader rights and
obligations with regard to the state are formed (Corbridge 2005). Others
likewise see the state as largely meaningful to ordinary citizens when it is
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visible in localized practices (Gupta 1995). Studies of the attitudes and
priorities of conflict-affected people have concluded that the degree to
which state’s meet citizens’ everyday needs is an important component of
their subjective assessment of it (Robins 2012, 4). From this perspective,
positive encounters with frontline service officials might feasibly be a
source of legitimacy for the state, particularly in fragile and conflict-
affected situations where the state was previously mistrusted, or outright
feared (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012, 279).
Likewise, one side of the virtuous circle posited in aid models is well
established, that is, the proposition that legitimacy enhances capacity. The
positive effects of the accrual of legitimacy on the capacity of states to
govern and to generate development has been empirically demonstrated
(Englebert 2002). Legitimacy enhances capacity because it makes citizens
more likely to defer to decisions and it rules out of a sense of obligation,
rather than through the threat (or exercise) of punishment or reward (Tyler
2006). Simply put, it makes ruling more efficient. The symbiotic relation-
ship between a belief in the rightfulness of the state and citizen compli-
ance underpins the stability of all political systems, and enables effective
governance (Beetham 1991).
Arguments supporting the other side of the virtuous circle—that
capacity necessarily enhances legitimacy—are typically more qualified.
It is widely acknowledged that the significance of service delivery
performance for state legitimacy is relative. While all definitions of legiti-
macy entail citizens evaluating whether or not the state is a proper,
just, or rightful authority (Tyler 2006, 375), there are differing accounts
of the importance of performance in this assessment. For Lipset (1984),
legitimacy derives from a combination of effectiveness, the organization
of political power, and how societies have historically resolved divisive
issues. In his view, effectiveness and legitimacy are engaged in a con-
tinual balancing act: Powerful groups (e.g., military, business) may
reject even a highly effective state if its basic values and symbolism
does not fit with their own. This qualifies the legitimizing effects of
service delivery by indicating these effects may depend on whose views
count.
The relative effects of services on legitimacy can also be qualified in a
temporal sense. Processes of legitimation can be thought of as the accrual
of “goodwill” or loyalty to the state, which varies at any given moment in
time (Gibson 2004, 289). A reservoir of legitimacy arguably affords the
state better prospects of riding out periods of poor performance, without
soliciting the withdrawal of consent (Gibson 2004, 289). From this perspec-
tive, whether or not a state’s performance on service delivery affects its
legitimacy may depend on the degree of legitimacy, or goodwill, it pos-
sessed in the first instance. Some maintain a chronic or acute breakdown
in effectiveness would even endanger the stability of an otherwise highly
legitimate state (Lipset 1984, 91). At a minimum, this is likely to be his-
torically contingent on broader processes of legitimation.
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The significance of service delivery for state legitimacy is also politically
contingent. Scholars have questioned whether the means and ends of the
“virtuous circle” are necessarily always virtuous (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg,
and Dunn 2012). Although from one perspective the physical presence of
services might well signal state “responsiveness,” from another, more
political perspective, they might form part of its coercive, political quest
for preeminence. Tilly’s (1992) seminal “coercion and capital” thesis illus-
trates that in Europe, the state’s incentives to deliver basic services derived
not from an altruistic quest for citizen well-being, but from the need to
pacify them, so as to be able extract revenue to fund war. In Migdal’s
(2001) state in society approach, goods and services are conceptualized as
part of a package of rewards, sanctions and symbols that the state ulti-
mately provides in order to achieve social control. These coercive and
controlling elements in the formation of social contracts are absent from
mainstream development policy narratives. Van de Walle and Scott (2011)
add another dimension, documenting how states have historically
pursued service delivery for the purposes of penetration (establishing
presence and visibility), standardization (quashing alternative power
sources), and accommodation (creating loyalty, resolving disputes). Taken
together, these insights call for a more political reading of the relationship
between service delivery and state legitimacy, starting with the premise
that legitimation processes are political struggles for order in social rela-
tions (Beetham 1991).
A further critique is that just as the institutional approach has domi-
nated the state-building literature in general, the debate about service
delivery as a source of state legitimacy has been colored by an institu-
tional perspective. Situating service delivery within a hierarchy of state
functions, as an output of an effective state apparatus, aligns with what
Lemay-Hébert (2009) identifies as the dominant institutional approach to
state-building, that is, one that views legitimacy as flowing automatically
from functioning institutions. There are two potential challenges to this
reductionist standpoint. The first is that pigeon-holing service delivery
in the discrete category of performance legitimacy neutralizes it, under-
estimating the degree to which services might also conceivably act as a
conduit for the state’s norms and values, or what Gupta (1995) calls the
“main myths and symbols” of the state. This has been argued with
respect to health systems, for example, that “intentionally or not” may
communicate the core values of the state to users, including its commit-
ment to equity, transparency and accountability (Kruk et al. 2010, 94).
In this way, service delivery is more than a question of the state’s
tangible functions and outputs, but also, to adopt a sociological perspec-
tive, a formative component of what Holsti calls the “idea of the state”
(1996, 83). After all, as Migdal (2001, 6) argues, “societies are not,
and cannot be bound only through material and instrumental relations”
but also require “relational glue” in the form of common rules and
meanings.
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The second, related challenge to the reductionist approach is that ide-
ology might shape citizens’ perceptions of the state’s performance. As
vomHau (2011) argues, an overemphasis on legitimacy as flowing directly
from tangible outputs has diverted our attention away from this possibil-
ity. Legitimacy theory provides a strong foundation for the value of ide-
ology in shaping belief; if legitimacy is fundamentally a belief in the
rightfulness of the state’s institutions (Beetham 1991), then those beliefs
might conceivably be generated by deliberate cues and signals from those
very institutions themselves. Lipset (1984, 86) specifically proposes legiti-
macy can be engineered by the state, dependent on its capacity to “engen-
der and maintain the belief that existing institutions are the most
appropriate or proper ones for the society.” In this interpretation, legiti-
mation is in the hands of the powerful (Beetham 1991, 9). Particularly in
the era of the electronic public sphere, perceptions of performance may
rely on effective public relations, as much as material rewards (Beetham
1991, 9). This theoretically opens up the possibility that the discourse used
by political leaders to frame and justify service delivery might influence
its significance for state legitimacy.
The Difficulties of Questioning the Received Wisdom
Empirical studies that could more rigorously interrogate the underpin-
nings of the received wisdom that services enhance state legitimacy
remain scant, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states
(Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012). In part, these limitations reflect
the methodological challenges inherent in measuring legitimacy.
One of the central unresolved issues relates to whether legitimacy is
best measured through people’s perceptions of the state, or through their
behavior toward it. If legitimacy is conceived essentially as a belief in the
rightfulness of the state, then researchers necessarily have to control for
the subjective origins of beliefs, and their heterogeneity. Particularly but
not only in fragile and conflict-affected states, there may be a dearth of
reliable public opinion data and, more fundamentally, even where it exists,
people may fear reporting their actual perceptions of the state (Call and
Cousens 2008, 15–16). According to Beetham (1991, 13), asking people
whether they believe a particular institution is legitimate is misleading
anyway: Not only are people unlikely to understand what “legitimacy”
means, but the more demonstrable, behavioral markers of legitimacy—
consent and compliance—are observable in the public sphere, not “in the
recesses of people’s minds.” For practical purposes, these observables may
be a more measurable effect of legitimacy (Gilley 2006, 49), but they
nevertheless do not have a direct relationship with it. As Schaar (1984)
argues, states can achieve compliant behavior through coercion, and
people can consent/not consent out of fear, including in situations where
the state is illegitimate by any other measure. In other words, the entitle-
ment or right to rule is not equivalent to deference to power (Schaar 1984).
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Another problem with measuring legitimacy is that it is difficult to differ-
entiate between people’s support for an incumbent government, or indi-
vidual leaders, and the more fundamental question of whether they accept
the state’s institutions as right and proper (Guerrero 2011).
To date, research on the determinants of state legitimacy has broadly
segmented between a group of scholars seeking to uncover its universal
correlates and others who maintain that legitimacy is more intuitively
understood by observing the texture of citizen–state relations at the
microlevel. In other words, legitimacy has been studied from above and
below. The methodological hallmark of the former approach has been
large-scale, quantitative studies, which tend to support the view that no
state relies on a single source of legitimacy. In these studies, it is sometimes
difficult to isolate the effects of measures of service performance on state
legitimacy, particularly where these are analyzed as one component of a
larger set of other indicators of socioeconomic development. In his analy-
sis of data from 72 countries, Gilley (2006), for example, concludes that
combined indicators of welfare gains, good governance, and democratic
rights, were “important correlates, and probably causes, of legitimacy”
(Gilley 2006, 48).3 Other studies have found the effects of service provision
on approval of and trust in the state (used as proxy variables4) to be
indirect, mediated by other markers of well-being, including food security
(Sacks 2009). While these studies indicate correlations between well-
functioning services and state legitimacy, they invariably conclude more
research is needed to examine the causal mechanisms that underlie these
correlations. In essence, they cannot explain why services might enhance
legitimacy, or what factors might influence any causal relationship
between them.
Factors Affecting the Relationship between Service Delivery and
State Legitimacy
Notwithstanding the above limitations, emerging research indicates that
the relationship between a state’s performance in service delivery, on the
one hand, and its degree of legitimacy, on the other, is nonlinear. In
practice, a number of factors interrupt any direct, causal relationship
between them. Specifically, this relationship is likely to be conditioned by
shifting expectations of what the state should provide, subjective assess-
ments of impartiality and distributive justice, the relational aspects of
provision, how easy it is to attribute (credit or blame) performance to the
state, and the technical and political characteristics of the service. Albeit
indicative, these findings support the proposition that legitimacy is essen-
tially socially constructed (Coicaud 2002; Holsti 1996). They suggest the
significance of service delivery for state legitimacy depends at least partly
on the locally determined normative criteria by which services are indi-
vidually and collectively judged.
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Shifting Expectations
Citizen’s expectations of what the state should provide appear to interrupt
any straightforward relationship between objective service outputs and
legitimacy gains.5 Highlighting the subjectivity of these expectations,
Sacks’s (2011) quantitative study across Africa, Latin America, and Asia
finds weak correlations between objective measures of delivery (e.g., the
mere presence of facilities) and citizens’ satisfaction with services. In this
case, citizens’ assessment of performance appeared to depend instead on
perceptions of how well government was “trying” to improve them.
Recent Afro-barometer public opinion survey data similarly indicate the
mere presence of physical infrastructure is not significant in shaping
popular views about government performance (Asunka 2013). Rather, the
quality of the experience (waiting times, availability of materials such as
drugs/textbooks) and the accessibility of the service (capacity to pay fees,
payment of bribes) are key (Asunka 2013). Indeed, perceptible improve-
ments in performance may be more significant than absolute or verifiable
measures of performance for legitimacy. In his study in Medellin, Colom-
bia, Guerrero (2011) finds that a quick upgrading of basic services (infra-
structure, health, education) in the city’s less favored districts improved
political support for and trust in government. Rapid improvements gen-
erated greater legitimizing returns than slower, less perceptible progress.
Collectively, these studies indicate that subjective interpretations of quality
and effort (rather than objective measures of them) are significant for the
relationship between service delivery and state legitimacy.
Aligning citizens’ expectations with state capacity, seen as the catalyst
for legitimizing effects in aid debates, is unlikely to be straightforward.
Particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states, citizens’ expectations
may be low, or nonexistent. In the Democratic Republic of Congo,
researchers identified what they termed a “legitimacy threshold,” charac-
terized by very low expectations of the state, and citizens’ aversion to its
intrusion into their everyday lives (Stel et al. 2012). The study concluded
that to improve state legitimacy, expectations had to first be “stimulated,”
through an initial show of performance (Stel et al. 2012). In contrast,
citizens might in some cases have high expectations of services, and even
be willing to pay for improvements, where they cite very low levels of
satisfaction with them. This finding is made by Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg,
and Dunn (2012) in Iraq, where satisfaction with water services did not
correspond with reported levels of trust in the state. These contrasting
findings—between an absence of any services and an aversion to the state,
and poor services that have no direct relationship with levels of trust in the
state—illustrate context specificity. They also signal that a foundational
level of services may first need to be established before subsequent
improvements are likely to affect citizens’ belief in the rightfulness of the
state. The dilemma is that particularly in postconflict situations, stimulat-
ing expectations may have to be balanced with the well-known risk of
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raising expectations above what is feasible, with potential negative impli-
cations for legitimacy if those expectations are not met (Brinkerhoff,
Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012).
Expectations have also been shown to shift over time. Recent multi-
country research in Nepal, Rwanda, and South Sudan indicates that in
some fragile and conflict-affected states where services are poor or
nonexistent, expectations can quickly graduate from initial concerns over
access, to include concerns over quality and cost (Ndaruhutse 2012). Fur-
thermore, there may be a “tipping point” in the legitimating returns from
provision, once expectations are met. This was recently found in Colombia
where, as service provision expanded, citizens’ level of satisfaction dimin-
ished, partly because once desired improvements in one location were
achieved, attention quickly turned to another area where performance was
lagging (Guerrero 2011). In this case, the relationship between improve-
ments in service delivery and enhanced state legitimacy appeared
U-shaped; an initial flurry of trust-generating effects faded over time as
citizens came to take service delivery for granted. These findings nuance
the idea that it is the alignment of expectations and capacity that produce
legitimating effects. They remind us that even where services are provided
to the full extent of state capacity, expectations may still not be met. Just as
expectations are a something of a moving target for the state, the effects of
meeting them on state legitimacy may likewise be temporary.
Perceptions of Impartiality and Distributive Justice
Others have argued that certain normative characteristics of performance
color citizens’ evaluations of the state, affecting the degree to which ser-
vices are likely to improve state legitimacy. Prominent among these is the
issue of perceptions of equity in the distribution of services (Ndaruhutse
2012). Qualitative research in Liberia, Nepal, and Colombia found that
unequal or exclusionary access to public goods was detrimental to citi-
zens’ views of the state’s rightfulness (Dix, Hussmann, and Walton
2012). Particularly in postconflict contexts where horizontal inequalities
prevail, a redistribution of services may therefore be important for
(re)legitimizing the state among excluded groups, including those alien-
ated through a period of conflict. However, this is likely to be a careful,
political, balancing act. Citing the case of Iraq, Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg,
and Dunn (2012) note that the redistribution of services to previously
excluded groups in the postwar period diminished the state’s overall legiti-
macy gains. This recalls the fundamental importance of understanding
whose views count in the assessment of the state’s performance. However,
since most studies do not disaggregate citizens’ perceptions of the state’s
performance along ethnic, area, or class lines, this is a widely neglected
question. In a rare exception, Carter’s (2011) research in South Africa
observed how people’s perceptions of state legitimacy differed according
to race, age, and gender, between urban and rural populations, and by
10 CLAIRE MCLOUGHLIN
their “lived experiences” of apartheid. Through this albeit isolated study,
attention is drawn to understanding the historic origins of the expectations
of different groups. In practice, citizens’ perceptions of the state can rarely
be aggregated.
In some cases, the degree to which service delivery is perceived as
procedurally fair has been shown to be significant in determining citizen’s
view of the state. In his widely cited research, Rothstein (2009) makes the
case that because basic service delivery devolves significant discretion to
low level public officials, the impartiality with which services are imple-
mented on the ground is of acute significance for political legitimacy. His
work empirically demonstrates that in developed states, greater impartial-
ity in the exercise of state power—including through service delivery—is
positively associated with higher levels of trust in government (Rothstein
2009). Other studies concur that whether or not services are operated
through open and transparent practices may be seen as a tangible marker
of the state’s broader commitment to accountability (Ndaruhutse 2012). At
a minimum, in order to solicit citizens’ trust and approval, officials (e.g.,
teachers, nurses) may need to treat the individuals with whom they inter-
act in a dignified manner (Sacks 2011). This is in line with one of the
central tenets of legitimacy theory that the perceived fairness of the
process through which authorities and institutions make decisions and
exercise authority is a key aspect of people’s willingness to comply with it
(Tyler 2006). On the other hand, Blundo and de Sardan’s (2006, 101)
attention to the “real functioning” of public services illustrates that
corrupt practices are not necessarily a source of illegitimacy; indeed, deliv-
ery that appears dysfunctional from a legal perspective may nevertheless
be regulated and legitimated by local social and cultural logics. In this way,
the relationship between the procedural fairness of services and legitimiz-
ing beliefs is best read in the context of local rather than universal norms.
Relational Aspects of Delivery
How services are organized and managed at the point of delivery could
also condition the effects of provision on state legitimacy. Cross-country
case study research looking specifically at multistakeholder processes6
concluded it was mainly the relationships formed through them that were
significant for citizens’ perceptions of the state (Stel et al. 2012). In particu-
lar, these processes created space for civil society organizations to articu-
late citizens’ demands, and to directly engage with government agencies.
They presented opportunities to build bridges between the state and social
groups (Stel et al. 2012). In other isolated cases, coproduction7 has played
a formative role in generating positive evaluations of the state on the part
of citizens. Research from China reveals that state officials themselves
understand the potential legitimizing returns from visible processes of
coproduction. Tsai (2011) finds that local state bureaucrats viewed collabo-
ration with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local communi-
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ties to implement local infrastructure services as a means of soliciting
citizens’ trust in them. Moreover, some officials believed collaboration
would enhance their capacity to elicit greater overall levels of citizen
compliance with state policies. This microlevel insight into the social con-
tract being “articulated” through service delivery highlights services can
bring citizens and states together not in a simple supply-and-demand
transaction, but also in a coproductive one. It recalls the argument that in
order to support their legitimacy, states require not just productive but
also relational capacity (Robinson 2008; Stel et al. 2012). Early indications
are that in the sphere of service delivery, the relational aspects of provision
matter for citizens’ evaluations of the state, and therefore also for any
potential legitimizing effects.
Who is perceived to be delivering a particular service might also influ-
ence whether or not the state accrues legitimacy from services, though
perhaps not in a straightforward way. The dominant position in aid policy
has been that parallel (nonstate) service delivery structures undermine
state legitimacy because they reduce the state’s visibility as provider
(Bellina et al. 2009). There is some supporting evidence of this from
Zambia, where citizens who (rightly or wrongly) credited nonstate provid-
ers with service delivery were found to be significantly less likely to have
confidence in their government, or to comply with taxes and regulations
(Sacks 2009). The counter view, however, is that whether or not nonstate
service delivery affects people’s perceptions of the state logically depends
onwhether people expected the state to deliver services directly in the first
place (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010). Stel (2011) makes this point in refer-
ence to perceptions of service delivery in Burundi, noting that because
people did not expect the state to be involved at the point of delivery, they
were not disappointed when it was not. Indeed, in fragile and conflict-
affected situations where the state may have been repressive, citizens may
not trust the state to deliver services, let alone expect it to (Brinkerhoff,
Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012). These findings suggest there is no univer-
sally applicable rule that nonstate provision undermines state legitimacy.
They indicate attentionmight more usefully be turned to whether forms of
provision are seen as normatively appropriate for populations, as has been
found recently in the case of international nonstate provision of basic
services in areas of limited statehood (Krasner and Risse 2014).
Attribution
Processes of attribution—specifically, how easy it is for people to credit or
blame the state for the delivery of services—may also interrupt any linear
causal relationship between service delivery and state legitimacy. Research
has shown that to whom people attribute service performance does not
always reflect who is actually delivering them in practice. Sacks (2009)
finds that citizens were incorrectly attributing government services to
nonstate actors where multiple other actors (NGOs, churches, and donors)
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were also providing services in the local area. Like others, she argues
attribution is primarily a product of visibility. In this particular instance,
nonstate actors were more effective at branding themselves than govern-
ment (Sacks 2009). Mindful of this potential for misattribution,
policymakers have called for measures to increase the visibility of the
state’s role in service provision at the point of delivery, including by
reducing donor and NGO branding (Teskey, Schnell, and Poole 2012). At
the same time, some research indicates that even where the state is not the
frontline provider of services, citizens may not be blind to its less palpable,
indirect roles in provision, which can include oversight, regulation, and
facilitation. Some focus groups have demonstrated that citizens can evalu-
ate this indirect role of the state beyond its physical presence at the point
of delivery (Stel et al. 2012). In Ethiopia, even where citizens attributed
service delivery to nonstate actors, they also understood that government
agencies were likely to be involved in the design process and, moreover,
they could differentiate between the quality of delivery and the degree to
which the state was fulfilling its responsibility in a broader sense
(Mandefro, Noor, and Stel 2012). Overall, these findings collectively draw
attention to understanding how citizens are informed about the particular
role of the state in provision, whether it is the direct deliverer or not, as
significant for the potential legitimizing effects of services.
How services are attributed to different levels of the state is also likely
to be significant. Isolated studies indicate that improved service outcomes
at the local level can enhance perceptions of the legitimacy of those agen-
cies directly responsible for them (Bukenya 2013). However, there is a
paucity of studies that can illustrate how this “scales up,” to affect state
legitimacy overall. Acknowledging this in relation to his research on HIV/
AIDS health clinics in Uganda, Bukenya (2013) concludes that improved
perceptions of local health clinics did not automatically translate into
improved perceptions of the central state. Some go further and argue that
highly localized, personalized relationships of exchange of services and
favors between individuals and local officials may actually undermine
wider legitimacy (Stel et al. 2012). Particularly in patron–client contexts,
reciprocity and exchange may be important aspects of the legitimation of
power only at the microlevel (Chabal and Daloz 1999). At a minimum, it
may be important to consider which level of government (if any) people
view as responsible for different services, and therefore where they are
likely to assign credit (or blame) for more or less effective performance
(Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012). Given that the state is not a
“coherent, integrated, and goal-oriented body” (Migdal 2001, 12), tracing
these intervening links between local delivery, and aggregate perceptions
of the broader institutions of the state is challenging. As illustrated here, it
is conceivable that perceptions of local delivery and overall assessments of
the state’s legitimacy may or may not be connected. This further qualifies
any straightforward causal relationship between local services and state
legitimacy.
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Sector Characteristics
The different technical and political characteristics of services may also
affect their potential as a source of state legitimacy. In particular, the
characteristics of visibility and information asymmetry may affect how
easy it is for citizens to assign credit or blame for performance
(Mcloughlin and Batley 2012). It is logical that performance has to be seen,
experienced, and appreciated in order for it to translate into legitimating
beliefs, but different services offer different scope for this. For example,
Guerrero (2011) finds that services have a greater effect on trust and
legitimating beliefs when they are both critical (salient) and highly visible
to the public. Moreover, his study suggests those that are easily
measureable (“as easy as turning the lights or the tap on”) and are expe-
rienced homogenously by a community in a geographically contained
area, are more capable of influencing levels of trust in the state than those
that are highly heterogeneous, or experienced differently by different
citizens (e.g., individual encounters with doctors). Likewise, to the degree
that citizens’ capacity to evaluate the quality of public services depends on
the degree of information they have about them (Jilke 2013), then levels of
information asymmetry may condition the legitimizing effects of perfor-
mance (Mcloughlin and Batley 2012). As Sacks (2011, 5) notes, available
information about service quality determine whether citizens can make
objective assessments of performance, or whether instead they rely on
subjective accounts.8 On this basis, the relationship between service deliv-
ery and state legitimacy is unlikely to be uniform across service sectors.
There are also normative reasons why particular services may be more
or less significant for state legitimacy in any given context. Kruk et al.
(2010, 91) afford health special status because it is universally seen as a
“super-ordinate value,” prized irrespective of ideology or political affili-
ation. In her statistical analysis of cross-country public opinion data, Sacks
(2011) also finds that basic health services potentially have a greater overall
effect on the approval of the incumbent government, compared to water
and sanitation services, because of the acute significance of health for
people’s daily lives. Education is sometimes singled out as the service
most capable of generating “social trust,” particularly where it can convey
values of equality, institutionalize transparency measures, and bring
young people from different ethnic, religious, and social groups together
(Rothstein 2011, 163). Likewise, where a service caters to the main con-
stituency of support of the ruling party, it may come to be viewed as a
particularly salient source of state legitimacy (e.g., food subsidies in
Malawi) (Mcloughlin and Batley 2012). While not suggesting there is a
universal hierarchy of services, these findings highlight that understand-
ing the potential for service delivery to enhance state legitimacy depends
on the normative value of different services in specific contexts, which
is unlikely to be uniform across countries, or even over time within
them.
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Conclusion: Toward a Rounded Account of the Relationship between
Service Delivery and State Legitimacy
Development policy literature on the role of public services in processes of
state legitimation has been colored by an understanding of the state as a
set of institutions that can be built through certain functions, and is yet to
convincingly embrace the “idea of the state.” This narrow interpretation of
the instrumental role of service delivery in processes of state legitimation
reflects the difficulties donors face in “getting beyond capacity.”9 In
essence, development agencies are locked in a tension between under-
standing legitimacy empirically as a belief based on people’s perceptions
and values, and pursuing it through the “one-size-fits-all” modus ope-
randi of state-building: capacity development.
The paucity of empirical work in this area raises an immediate question
over the received wisdom that service delivery necessarily enhances state
legitimacy. Quantitative research, with its sophisticated analysis of corre-
lations between services and indicators of legitimacy, cannot account for
the causal processes through which services might influence citizens’ per-
ceptions of the state. In qualitative inquiry, there have been few historical
case studies to trace how citizens adjust their perceptions of the state, and
indeed their behavior toward it, in response to relative improvements in
service delivery over time.
In spite of these limitations, it is clear that in practice a number of
factors interrupt any direct causal relationship between a state’s perfor-
mance in delivering basic services, on the one hand, and its degree of
legitimacy, on the other. Specifically, this relationship is likely to be con-
ditioned by shifting expectations of what the state should provide, subjec-
tive assessments of impartiality and distributive justice, the relational
aspects of provision, how easy it is to attribute (credit or blame) perfor-
mance to the state, and the technical and normative characteristics of
particular services.
The findings of this article illustrate there is no straightforward align-
ment between objective service outputs and legitimacy gains. Even where
expectations are low, they may quickly shift over time, and are likely to
vary between different social groups, creating something of a moving
target for the state. Furthermore, beyond its instrumental value, perfor-
mance is normative: Services can act as a conduit for the norms and values
of the state. In some cases, perceptions of impartiality and distributive
justice in allocations of services between groups have been significant for
citizens’ evaluations of its rightfulness. This implies that service delivery
might be analyzed outside of the restrictive, instrumental bracket of per-
formance legitimacy, as also a source of process and normative legitimacy.
The narrow focus on whether nonstate provision undermines state
legitimacy has arguably masked the more pressing question of whom
citizens expect to deliver services, and whether forms of provision are
considered normatively appropriate in particular contexts. Related to this,
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understanding attribution—or how citizens come to credit/blame or
reward/sanction the state for relative improvements or deteriorations in
service levels—is an important through not well-understood link in the
hypothesized causal chain between services and state legitimacy. To this
end, there is a need for a more joined up analysis of the localized effects of
services on trust in local bureaucracies and citizens’ beliefs in the broader
state’s right to rule. Attribution is neither guaranteed nor always techni-
cally correct, depending on the visibility of and information available
about the state’s role in provision. Likewise, the relationship between
service delivery and state legitimacy is unlikely to be uniform across
services, because they offer different possibilities for attributing responsi-
bility for performance to the state, and their significance to societies is
likely to vary according to local norms, values, and priorities at particular
points in time.
Taken together, the above findings call for a more rounded account of
the relationship between service delivery and state legitimacy, one that
starts from a recognition that this relationship is not automatic. They
suggest research and policy might look beyond the material to the ide-
ational and relational significance of services for citizens’ evaluations of
the state. Central to this is a deeper reading of the social construction of
legitimacy that engages with the moral and normative criteria by which
citizens’ individually and collectively judge service delivery institutions.
Future empirical inquiry could usefully focus on the texture of citizens’
everyday encounters with service bureaucracy and how these affect citi-
zens’ perceptions of the state from the “bottom up.” More longitudinal
and historical research designs could better capture how expectations and
perceptions of levels and quality of provision alter over time. These strat-
egies might advance a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the
relationship between service delivery and state legitimacy in particular
cultural and socioeconomic contexts. The significance of this agenda is to
understand under what circumstances service delivery fulfills the dual
imperative of meeting basic needs and state-building, and whether aid
interventions can ever convincingly claim to do both.
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Notes
1. See, for example, analysis of South Africa’s recent service delivery by Alex-
ander (2010).
2. Weber’s definition of legitimacy as “the prestige of being considered exem-
plary or binding” is the classic empirical one (Weber 1962, 73).
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3. Gilley (2006, 50–51) identifies 34 potential sources of legitimacy, including,
in the socioeconomic sphere alone, personal financial satisfaction, social
capital, national pride, levels of political interest and efficacy, regime-
conducive attitudes, social deference (or the ideological hegemony of the
regime), population size, and regional effects as among them.
4. Trust in government is considered a marker of obligation or willingness to
obey laws, and therefore an antecedent to legitimacy (see Levi, Sacks, and
Tyler 2009).
5. In principle, these expectations might be based on what they think the state
can deliver, learned through past performance, or what they think it ought to
deliver, infused by ideology or belief (OECD 2011).
6. Multistakeholder processes are “initiatives that are aimed at bringing
together different stakeholders (state, civil society, private sector, beneficiary
communities and international organisations) to engage them in a process of
dialogue and collective action” (Stel et al. 2012, 9).
7. Coproduction is the joint and direct involvement of both public agents and
private citizens in the provision of services (Ostrom 1996).
8. Sacks (2011) notes that there are likely to be multiple channels through
which messages about performance are conveyed in any given social
setting, including through neighbors, media, religious and traditional
authorities, or government itself.
9. This phrase comes from Teskey et al. (2012).
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